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VBIEDS IN THE
MEXICAN CRIMINAL
INSURGENCY
At least 130,000 people have been killed in
the ongoing Mexican “crime war,” and many
more have been kidnapped or simply gone
missing.1 Yet despite the significance of these
numbers, official reports and news accounts
frequently underreport the toll of this war.

Counter
The

Iraqi Security Police investigate a destroyed car used as a Vehicle Borne Improvised Explosive
Device (VBIED) in which both occupants died. Photo by: Tsgt Roy Santana
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By Robert J. Bunker and John Sullivan

M

exican cartels and
gangsters clearly
use violence to further their business
interests. Threats and violence ward off
competition and discourage interference
with illegal drug transshipment points
(plazas) and distribution nodes. The
cartels have also directly confronted
Mexico’s government, leading to a

crisis of state solvency (the net result
of capacity and legitimacy) that can be
characterized as “criminal insurgency.”2
So far, the majority of cartel actions
have involved small arms—such as
the classic cuerno de chivo (AK-47).
Mass shootings, grenade attacks,
dismemberments, beheadings, and
blockades (narcobloqueos) are also

common tactics. Additional weapons
employed by cartels include both
improvised armored fighting vehicles
known as narcotanques and car bombings
(coches bomba). In fact, use of car bombs
or VBIEDs (vehicle-borne improvised
explosive devices) is a tactic that has
been employed with varying frequency
throughout the conflict.
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Sinaloa Cartel officer Javier Torres Felix is deported to Mexico after completing his sentence in the U.S. He was immediately arrested in Mexico
for pending charges in his homeland. Photo by: U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement

CARTEL VBIED USE IN
MEXICO
VBIEDs have been employed in several
attacks by cartels in Mexico, with the
majority of these incidents occurring
between July 2010 and July 2012. The
first widely reported contemporary
Mexican car bombing occurred in
embattled Ciudad Juárez on Thursday,
15 July 2010, with four people killed in

30 The Counter Terrorist ~ December 2013/January 2014

an ambush on the Federal Police.3 The
last major VBIED attack of this period
occurred on 31 July 2012 in Culiacán,
Sinaloa. Other isolated VBIED-related
incidents have taken place outside of this
period, however. For example, on 14 July
2008 in Culiacán, Sinaloa, two explosive
devices integrated with gas cylinders (in
an attempt to enhance lethality) were
discovered in a vehicle at a cartel safe
house.

In our monograph Cartel Car Bombings
in Mexico, we tracked 20 VBIED
incidents between 2010 and 2012. Two
of these incidents involved multiple
devices (one in 2011 with two car bombs,
and one in 2012 with two vehicle-borne
incendiary devices).4 The Mexican
attorney general or PGR (Procuradura
General de la República) reported 16
car bomb incidents for the 2010-2012
timeframe.5 Use of VBIEDs has virtually
stopped since that sequence. The only
reported incident since our analysis of
the 2010-2012 incidents was an alleged
CNG (El Cártel Nueva Generación) car
bomb—actually an improvised incendiary
device accompanied by a narcomanta
(narco-banner)—detonated outside the
Reclusorio Oriente correctional facility in
Distrito Federal, Mexico City.6

VBIED DESIGN AND
CONSTRUCTION
The VBIEDs employed by Mexican
cartels have generally been low-yield
devices—more “bombs in cars” than
higher-yield devices that take advantage
of the volume of explosives that a vehicle
(especially a van or larger truck) can
accommodate. Accurate information
on the design and construction of
these devices is limited. Payload sizes
encountered have been in the 10- and
16-kilogram range. Types of explosives
utilized include Tovex (a mining
explosive), dynamite, and C-4. Electric
detonation systems are typically triggered
via cell phone activation; however, a
Futaba radio controller has also been
recovered. The cartels are also known to
possess detonation cord.

A glimpse into the construction of
one of these devices is available in a
Mexican Cartel Tactical Note focusing
on a VBIED recovered in January 2012.
This particular VBIED was meant for
detonation next to a police station in
Ciudad Victoria, Tamaulipas, but was
seized before it could be employed.
Photos of the device, hidden in the trunk
of a vehicle, were utilized for forensic
purposes; however, due to poor photo
quality, only a limited analysis was
conducted.7
A limited number of 60mm mortar
rounds, claymore mines, and numerous
RPG rounds have been recovered in
Mexico. To date, none of these munitions
have been reported incorporated into
VBIEDs. Conceivably, hand and rifle
grenades—both older muzzle-launched
forms and modern launched variants—
could be bundled together for boosting
purposes, along with gasoline and other
highly flammable fuels (such as that
found in the July 2008 VBIED incident),
to augment these improvised explosive
systems.

PATTERNS OF
EMPLOYMENT
Threats and Warnings: Cartel VBIEDs
have been primarily utilized against
Mexican military and police personnel,
the media, and businesses to encourage or
discourage certain behavior. The intent is
to both threaten and warn against taking
particular actions, in order to motivate a
shift to activities more favorable to cartel
policies and desires. Examples include
warning military personnel away from
cracking down on a specific cartel or
threatening a newspaper from reporting
on a cartel leader’s activities. In numerous
incidents in which VBIEDs were left
outside facilities, the detonations resulted
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in no causalities; however, the implicit
threat of what would happen if unwanted
behaviors continued was made clear.
Psychological Warfare/Terrorism: Implicit
in the above threats and warnings dynamic
is the use of psychological warfare (and
terrorism) principles to generate fear,
terror, and the ambiguity of not knowing
when or if an attack might come. The
creation of an ever-present feeling of
imperilment induces high levels of stress.
VBIED employment patterns represent
another cartel capability in addition
to the use of direct assaults, snipers,
kidnapping, and torture to terrorize
and resocialize populations. VBIED
employment against a police headquarters
building in April 2012, a city hall in
June 2012, and the private residence of
a chief security officer in July 2012—all
in the state of Tamaulipas—represents
an ongoing campaign to terrorize public
officials so they become compliant with
cartel control.
Diversion: Here, a VBIED or
incendiary device is detonated to draw
a police or security response and thus
distract responders from another attack.
This creation of a diversion is similar to
the use of narcobloqueos (narco-blockades)
to channelize maneuver options and
is essentially an anti-maneuver tactic.
Narcobloqueos typically involve large
trucks or buses and frequently include
tanker trucks that are set ablaze to
complicate response.8
Anti-Personnel Targeting: This targeting
theme can be seen in both the initial
July 2010 Ciudad Juárez bombing,
which drew in unsuspecting police and
responder personnel, and later in the
much more sophisticated attack in Nuevo
Laredo, Tamaulipas, on 24 May 2012.
In that incident, police personnel at a

A simulated VBIED at the National Training Center (NTC).
Photo by: Master Sgt. Johancharles Van Boers

makeshift barracks at the Hotel Santa
Cecilia—a small L-shaped motel—were
targeted. Gunfire directed at the motel
drew them out of their rooms into the
parking lot. A small device was then
detonated in the back of a pickup truck
next to the motel. Eight officers and two
civilians were wounded as a result.
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Anti-Vehicular/Anti-Materiel Targeting:
In an incident in Monterrey, Nuevo
Leon, on 20 October 2011, a Mexican
military convoy was drawn into an
ambush in which a parked car on the
side of a road was detonated. Because
none of the vehicles in the passing
convoy were damaged, it is not known

whether the low-yield VBIED detonated
prematurely and/or did not function
properly or whether this attack was
meant as only a threats and warnings
incident.2 In another incident, albeit a
quasi-VBIED one, in Ciudad Victoria,
Tamaulipas, on 6 June 2012, two vehicles
at a car dealership were targeted. In what
appeared to be an extortion plot, the gas
tanks of the vehicles were ignited either
by grenades or Molotov cocktails.

PATTERNS OF
EMPLOYMENT NOT
DEMONSTRATED
VBIEDS can be used in more
destructive employment profiles than
those described above. To date, Mexican
cartel use of VBIEDs has been far more
constrained than use of these devices by
contemporary al-Qaeda-linked groups, as
well as the bombings carried out by both
Hezbollah and Colombian cartels during
the late 1980s and early 1990s. VBIED
patterns not demonstrated in Mexico
include the following:
Mass/Indiscriminate Killing: VBIED
casualty figures in Mexico have been
low, with one incident resulting in four

deaths, another in two deaths, and a
further incident in one death. Upper
totals for injuries have been seven in
two incidents and three in three others.
Numerous incidents have yielded no
deaths or injuries. By comparison, the
highest fatality- and injury-producing
cartel incident utilizing an explosive
device was a September 2008 grenade
attack in the main square of Morelia,
Michoacán, during a festival. In that
incident, detonation of multiple
fragmentation grenades resulted in eight
deaths and over 100 injuries.
Anti-Infrastructure Targeting:
There is currently no evidence that
purposeful anti-infrastructure attacks
utilizing VBIEDs—with the intent of
destroying buildings or other forms
of infrastructure—have taken place in
Mexico. The most similar style incident
would be the use of arson by a gang of
gunmen against the Casino Royale in
Monterrey, Nuevo Leon, resulting in 52
deaths and over a dozen injuries. To place
this in context regarding upper casualty
thresholds, the most devastating cartel
VBIED attack of all time was an incident
involving a security building in Medellin,

The creation of an
ever-present feeling of
imperilment induces
high levels of stress.
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A Blackwater MD-530 responds to a VBIED in Baghdad, Iraq.
Photo by Master Sgt. Michael E. Best

Colombia, in December 1989. In that
attack, a 500-kilogram VBIED was
detonated, killing 59 people and injuring
1,000. This was one of the largest
VBIEDs to be employed in the Western
Hemisphere.
Suicide/Martyrdom Operations: As of
September 2013, no evidence has been
reported of a car or truck driver engaging,
or even attempting to engage, in a suicide
or martyrdom-style operation using a
VBIED in Mexico. The most similar
incident may be that of the July 2010
Ciudad Juárez bombing, in which a
bound and wounded man was dressed as
a police officer and used as an unwilling
decoy in a “bait and wait” trap to kill
Mexican police and first responders.9
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PRESENT AND FUTURE
USE
VBIED use by Mexican organized
crime cartels has been dormant
since August 2012, after sustained
multiyear employment beginning
in July 2010. The reasons for
this “strategic pause” in VBIED
use are unknown. Strangely, the
pause correlates with the Mexican
presidential elections at the end
of July 2012 and the subsequent
victory of Enrique Peña Nieto, the
Institutional Revolutionary Party
(PRI) candidate. Also interesting, an
earlier period of limited cartel VBIED
employment existed in the early
1990s. During that period, VBIEDs

Truck bomb in Cali, Colombia, August 2006. Photo by: Segan
were used by the cartels against one
another, rather than against governmental
security personnel, the press, and
businesses.
A cartel’s selection of tactics is
driven by the environment. Although
Mexico’s cartels have the capability (both
knowledge and materials) to conduct

VBIED attacks, they apparently do not
have need for such attacks at the present
time. They are able to achieve desired
results by use of other tactics, techniques,
and procedures (TTPs). Both sophisticated
and simple variants of VBIEDs—i.e., both
car bombs and “bombs in cars”—are better
used when seeking to shape strategic space.

That is, VBIEDs become more valuable
when seeking to manipulate mass opinion
during a campaign to secure control of
turf or a contested plaza. Other tools
(such as grenades or individual armed
assaults) are better suited to tactical
engagements or retaliation for individual
transgressions against the cartel.
Although the religious fervor of the
Knights Templar (Cabelleros Templarios)
cartel in Michoacán may at first
glance raise the possibility of potential
martyrdom operations (involving vehicleor person-borne devices), such attacks
may not be likely. The instrumental
violence of the drug wars originates in
local contexts, not in the context of global
jihad. Furthermore, narcocultura exploits
religious imagery to sustain images of
social bandits, not religious martyrs. San
Nazario is a venerated icon of innate
rebellion, but the local context does not
mirror the Middle East. Beheadings are
used to dehumanize adversaries, not
mimic jihadis. Likewise, VBIEDs in
Mexico must be viewed in the context of
the Mexican criminal insurgency and not
forced to mirror global jihad imagery that
does not fit.
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VBIED spillover from the Mexican
conflict into the United States is a
possibility. Current probabilities are
low—especially since VBIED use has
presently ramped down in Mexico.
However, gangsters in the U.S. have
already employed bombings, and the
future may make key U.S. cities or
neighborhoods within those cities into
contested plazas, transportation corridors,
and distribution nodes. An awareness of
VBIED potentials, TTPs, and response
considerations is therefore prudent, in the
border zone and enclaves upstream where
cartel-gang interpenetration drives gang
warfare.
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